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Colburn: The Cynic at the Circus

THE CYNIC AT THE CIRCUS
Jamison E. Colburn*
The October 2008 Term at the United States Supreme Court involved five cases
nominally bearing on "environmental law" in the United States. In addition to yet
another standing case and a preliminary injunction case,2 the Court heard three statutory
interpretation cases-one involving the Superfund cleanup statute,3 two involving the
Clean Water Act (CWA).4 From that vantage, it should have been a notable term that
changed casebooks, changed environmental law doctrine, or resolved some long-burning
questions.5 But the Court did nothing of the sort. It framed up five meticulously rendered
issues and authored narrow-even technical-opinions on the tightly constrained
questions raised therein. 6 This has been the pattern for some time at the Supreme Court
and it is becoming the pattern in the courts of appeal, too. 7
When our appellate courts decide 'environmental' cases today, they enter a world
where no one is in charge, where no single institutional actor actually sets the major
value priorities, and where there is no single overarching point. They enter a nexus of
competing themes, attractions, and distractions-a circus. And they are constantly
invited to provide that which they will never provide: the overarching priorities.
* Professor of Law, Penn State University. My thanks to Jim May and Mike Dorf for helpful comments
on an earlier draft.
1. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147 (2009). Obviously, standing cases are not
necessarily "environmental" in nature. A disproportionate share of the Court's contemporary standing doctrine,
however, has come in response to the "citizen suit" litigation so characteristic of our environmental statutes.
See e.g. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517-518 (2007); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528
U.S. 167, 174 (2000); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83, 86 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildhife, 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992).
2. Winter v. Natl. Resources Def Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 370 (2009).
3. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S., 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874 (2009).
4. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. S.E. Alaska Conserv. Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2463 (2009); Entergy v.
Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1502 (2009).
5. October 2008 ranks among the leading modem Supreme Court Terms for its environmental fare,
certainly. The only other similar Term in recent memory is October 2006, where the Court also heard fully five
environmental cases. See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517-518; Envtl. Def v. Duke Energy, 549 U.S. 561, 65-66
(2007); United Haulers Assn. v. Oneida-HerkeimerSolid Waste Mgt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007); US. v.
Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 131 (2007); National Assn. of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
551 U.S. 644, 649 (2007).
6. Coeur Alaska, for example, involved the Court in a somewhat moribund internecine struggle between
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers over the propriety of a CWA permit the Corps had issued for a
discharge of mining waste. Coeur Alaska,129 S.Ct. at 2463. Not only was this chiefly a matter of interpreting
EPA rules on CWA permitting authority, it also came down to some of the finer details of the Court's own
deference doctrines. Id. at 2471-2477, 2479.
7. Imagine this Supreme Court handling the issues that divided the justices in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972). Today, the opinions in environmental cases are becoming as "granular" in the courts of appeal
as they usually are at the Supreme Court.
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The Cynics of ancient Greece, especially Diogenes, viewed their culture's
dominant values with disdain and sought to discount categorically what, in their view,
was at the root of so much social discord, dispute, and strife. Theirs was not a selfstanding philosophy, tradition, or school, but rather a series of "philosophizing" gestures
that were "hostile and parodic incursions onto the territory" of the true philosophers like
Plato.9 Cynicism since Burke, though, is perhaps most noted for discrediting Rousseau
and other revolutionaries who had invoked its teachings against the eighteenth century's
dominant ideologies. Modern cynics are those who presume the insincerity of others
and doubt everyone's motives. 11 "The modem cynic-whose attributes include distrust,
disbelief, shameless indifference, and contempt for all motives besides self-interest and
pursuit of power-appears in a society in which opinions circulate, but in ways that
ensure that they have no particular force or effect upon its political direction.",12 Our
somewhat cynical appellate judges enter the environmental law circus doubting
everyone's motives, viewing the combat they are called to referee with a special form of
contempt that is now manifesting itself at a systemic level.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the five cases of the 2008 Term reaffirmed how
conflicted federal "environmental law" is growing in the U.S. if we assess it as either (1)
a field of practice that is meant to foster positive change on behalf of something called
"the environment," or (2) a field of practice wherein norms being cultivated by
"environmental lawyers" (be they norms of statutory interpretation, the valuation of
nature, etc.) make a practical difference. Indeed, these cases perhaps best demonstrate
the normative and political malfunctioning of our 'system' of environmental laws
wherein gigantic, programmatic statutes leave all the major questions of valuation and
priority unanswered-questions that then constantly arise in the very institutional
settings where they cannot be resolved; that is, before administrative agencies and courts.
And, to be sure, the jurisdictional landscape of modem environmental law does not
match its normative pretensions. The 2008 Term provided us all with a cynical
perspective of this mismatch, but this is also an opportunity to glimpse what may be on
the distant horizon. I take each of these claims in turn and use two of the Court's five
most recent cases to make the argument.
I.

A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIELD OF "ENVIRONMENTAL" LAW

U.S. environmental law is overwhelmingly statutory and regulatory in source.
Indeed, at the very moment that our common law courts were beginning to adapt to our
enhanced consciousness of environmental damage and loss, many courts took to labeling
the matter a legislative-political-problem. 13 Thus, the mechanics of environmental
law in America have always boiled down to the construction and implementation of

8. See Bertrand Russell, The History of Western Philosophy 228-233 (Simon and Schuster 1945).
9. See David Mazella, The Making of Modern Cynicism 41 (U. of Va. Press 2007).
10. See id at 143-175 (describing Burk's harsh critique of Rousseau and Rousseau's use of Diogenes'
teachings).
11. See id at 4.
12. Id. at 174.
13. See e.g. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
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enacted texts.14 This is not the place to analyze statutory interpretation as such, so a
simple over-generalization of the field will have to do. There are at least two contrasting
modes of statutory construction in our tradition. The first is avowedly positivistic. It
prescribes that judges should read and apply the statute as they expect, prove, or simply
hypothesize our tri-partite legislature (House, Senate, and President) would have
understood it to mean. Our founders bequeathed to us perhaps the most trying legislative
process the world has ever known, 15 and this can easily become an involved (and trying)
interpretive exercise.16 For example, the Senate is a famously distortive institution that
ensures that our national legislative processes pay inordinate attention to the voters of
Alaska, the Dakotas, Delaware, Montana, Vermont, and Wyoming. 17 Our Presidency is
even more curious: besides the "dreadful" process we have for selecting our
Presidents,18 the Presidential veto Article I, § 7 protects arguably creates one of the most
potent opportunities around for "special interest" frustration of the majority's will. 19
Interpreting the legislation that is finally wrought in this crucible entails a substantial
capacity for creative construction and perhaps even "deal" reconstruction.20
Thus, another type of interpretive method altogether is avowedly normative by
nature. This method allows for the judiciary to serve an important corrective function in
interpreting statutes and ought to impose things like default rules or even clear value
preferences on legislation precisely because there are important norms or values that
would otherwise go under-expressed in society.21 This form of statutory interpretation
can range from preference-eliciting approaches (based on a belief that legislators want
most of all to avoid taking firm positions)22 to outright outcome-oriented judging
wherein a variety of "normative" canons like liberality toward Native American tribes,
14. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Making ofEnvironmentalLaw (U. of Chi. Press 2004).
15. See e.g. Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution 36 (Oxford U. Press 2006) ("If one is
especially fearful of bad legislation-and especially if one believes that most bad legislation is worse, on some
relevant measure, than offsetting good legislation that might otherwise be passed-then one will obviously
want to make it quite difficult to pass any legislation at all."). In fact, good arguments have been made that a
general skepticism of legislative authority-and of legislative action in general-animated the founders
collectively and that that coincided with the rise of a philosophical tradition which survives still today. See e.g.
Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (U. of N.C. 1969); see Don Herzog,
Poisoningthe Minds of the Lower Orders 13-23 (Princeton U. Press 1998).
16. See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 142-146 (Clarendon Press 1999).
17. See Levinson, supran. 15 at 50-51.
18. Id. at 81-83.
19. See e.g. Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of US. Lawmaking (U. of Chi. Press 1998)
(hypothesizing that, for the money, time, and effort it takes, the single most efficient investment for so-called
special interests to make in affecting the U.S. legislative process is in convincing the President to exercise or to
threaten to exercise a veto). The "fable" of a nationally representative Presidency that opposes a parochial
Congress is demolished in Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the NationalistPresidentand the ParochialCongress, 53
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1217 (2005).
20. See e.g. Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540-541 (1983) (suggesting a
theory of statutory interpretation wherein judges attempt to reconstruct the "deal" reached among the partisans
who formed the supermajority that gained its passage and then to elaborate that deal's terms and conditions).
21. See e.g. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory ofJudicialReview 43 (Harv. U. Press 1980).
Professor Mashaw, for example, offers a theory of judicial review of agency action predicated on "public
choice" theory's diagnosis of our whole system's ills. It boils down, in substantial part, to the judiciary's
insinuation of various values into the statutory regimes that govern so much of modem life. See Jerry L.
Mashaw, Greed, Chaos and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (Yale U. Press 1997).
22. See e.g. Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret UnclearLegislation 7 (Harv. U. Press
2008).
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lenity in criminal cases, etc., are used to "construe" a statute and extract something other
than its strictest sense. 23
These two forms of statutory interpretation-positive and normative-are common
in federal court and arguably have been so throughout modern environmental law's
history. And they are in deep tension with one another even though it is often hard to tell
the two apart in real opinions. Indeed, the contrast between these two approaches to
statutes only grows more jagged and intractable as our courts confront the single most
dominant facet of environmental law: the ubiquity of agencies and agency authority.
Deference to administrative agencies' interpretations complicates the whole project. 24
Administrative agencies' legal authority has lately become one of the most litigious and
complex fields of federal law.25 Due in no small part to the pretensions of generality and
method found in Supreme Court opinions like Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.26 (a
Clean Air Act case!), a mountain of Supreme Court precedents speaking to the lower
federal courts have now made allocating interpretive authority as between courts and
agencies into a labyrinthine enterprise of doctrinal navigation.27 Congress's intentions
are perhaps unclear by nature2 8 and, in some reported cases, it has been the very
complexity of the underlying statute that has augured for more or less deference to
agency interpretations.29
But the real trouble with deference to agency interpretations has always been its
justification.30 Virtually every serious justification--every reason given for a court's
deferring to an agency interpretation-is obviously overbroad. Agencies are not always
expert, not always more "accountable" than courts, and do not always have Congress's

23. Normative canons have been around for many, many years and have been dubbed a variety of names.
See e.g. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 31-43 (Hary. U. Press 1982); William N.
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 78 Geo. L.J. 321, 322-323
(1989); James N. Landis, Statutes and the Sources ofLaw, 2 Hary. J. on Legis. 7, 7-8 (1965); John F. Manning,
DerivingRules of StatutoryInterpretationfrom the Constitution, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1648, 1648-1649 (2001);
Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation (Hary. U. Press
2006).
24. For contrasts between these two modes of interpretation in the review of agency action, see Kenneth A.
Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review ofAdministrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 66-67 (2008).
25. See generally A Guide to Judicialand PoliticalReview of FederalAgencies (John F. Duffy & Michael
Herz eds., ABA 2005) [hereinafter Guide].
26. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
27. See e.g. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009) (a 4-1-4 judgment upholding an FCC
interpretation against challenge that the FCC had changed its interpretation without adequately explaining its
reasoning); Gonzales v. Or., 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (a 5-4 judgment invalidating the Attorney General's
interpretation of a Justice Department regulation and the underlying statute based on finding that the
"structure" of statute was intended to preclude the Attorney General from regulating parties and practices that
had traditionally been regulated by states); Natl. Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. BrandXInternetSers., 545 U.S.
967, 982-983 (2005) (holding that prior judicial interpretations of statutes agencies administer can bind an
agency only where court held that the statute's meaning was unambiguous and therefore foreclosed any
alternative interpretation); U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
28. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Hary. L. Rev. 1036, 1036-1037 (2006).
29. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-845; Natl. Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327,
339 (2002) (observing that "as a general rule, agencies have authority to fill gaps," especially where the statute
and/or subject matter is "technical, complex, and dynamic").
30. See David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis for JudicialDeference to Administrative Rules, 17 Yale J.
Reg. 327, 339-362 (2000).
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authorization (implicit or otherwise) when they act. 31 Indeed, the same dichotomy of
interpretive purposes that marks the judiciary's approach to statutes could easily be used
to characterize agencies' interpretive approaches as well.3 2 And this perhaps further
encourages the courts to engage in their own version of the latter, overtly normative form
of statutory interpretation in cases involving agency interpretations. 33 Agencies are often
in perceptible states of collapse. And, in fact, whatever pretensions to rule-like deference
the Supreme Court may have signaled over the years, the lower federal courts, like the
Supreme Court, still treat agency interpretations as loose and only partly effective
constraints.34
Take the purest recent example. Confronted with an Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Air Act's (CAA) definition of "air pollutant"
which categorically excluded greenhouse gases, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded to the agency with specific instructions that its interpretation of the statute
comport with the Court's. 35 On the agency finding that greenhouse gases ought not to be
governed according to the CAA as structured, the Court held that the "statutory text
foreclose[d] EPA's reading" 36-notwithstanding an at least colorable claim from the
Executive that one of the Court's own precedents endorsed the agency's interpretive
method 37 and that, in the agency's "judgment," the CAA was just not the right tool for
this job. 38
What was most striking in Massachusetts v. EPA, however, was the majority's
implicit insistence that it was doing nothing but reading the statute in its strictest sense.
The Court did not, for example, express any values or norms into its analysis that it
found insufficiently protected by the political process. 39 Indeed, against the backdrop set

31. This perhaps explains why the single largest category of cases decided with full opinions by the
Supreme Court from 1984-2005 involved not only no provision of Chevron deference to an agency's
interpetation, but also no provision of any deference to the agency's interpretation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum ofDeference: Supreme Court Treatment ofAgency StatutoryInterpretations
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1190 (2008).
32. Agencies are at least as capable of what Joseph Raz has called "interpretation as discovery"-a kind of
interpretation "without retrieval," so to speak-as are courts. See Joseph Raz, Interpretation Without Retrieval,
in Law and Interpretation:Essays in Legal Philosophy 155, 166-171 (Andrei Marmor ed., Oxford U. Press
1995). The fact that courts and most commentators pay almost no attention to agencies' interpretive methods,
however, establishes nothing at all about those methods. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices and the
Paradox of Deference: A PreliminaryInquiry Into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501,
502-503 (2005).
33. See e.g. Rapanos v. US. Army Corps of Engineers, 547 U.S. 715, 737-738 (2007); Solid Waste Agency
of N. Cook Co. v. US. Army Corps ofEngineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001).
34. See Eskridge & Baer, supra n. 31, at 1098; Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Modem Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1271 (2007). Hickman and Krueger identified 104
court of appeals' cases applying Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), in lieu of Chevron from 20012006. Hickman & Krueger, supra. n. 34, at 1259-1267. Their findings were principally that Skidmore turns out
to be quite similar to Chevron in operation, although this is a curious finding given the supposed polarity of the
two doctrines. Id at 1271. Importantly, they separated out cases that applied Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), on the theory that it falls into some other category of deference. Id. at 1262.
35. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-535.
36. Id. at 528.
37. EPA had argued from its first denial of the rulemaking petitions that greenhouse gases were to the CAA
what tobacco was to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as held in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120 (2000); Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 530-531; see e.g. 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52927 (Sept. 8, 2003).
38. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532-535.
39. See id. at 528-532.
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by Chevron and other deference doctrines, it would almost certainly have undermined
the Court's authority if it had confessed that the Act as authored meant one thing and the
Act as interpreted by the Court meant another. 40
To be sure, the Court could easily have argued that the gravity and/or asymmetry
of the harms global warming will cause justified a heightened scrutiny of so obviously
"politicized" an agency interpretation. 4 1 And perhaps the obvious politicization of the
issue would even have justified a holding that purported to finally and authoritatively
interpret the Act opposite the Agency's interpretation. Yet, just as surely, the Court
authored no such holding. In what has since been described as a "signal," as easily the
"most important environmental law decision in well over a decade," 42 and as a
"bellweather," the Court purported simply to read the statute as its legislators wrote it
and to hold that it could not mean what the agency said it meant. 43
Of course, how legislation ought to be interpreted-either as a normative or as an
institutional matter-has never been noticeably different in "environmental" law. If
anything, the statutes, procedures, and precedents that wind up in American
environmental law classrooms are but tokens of the broader type. The same issues,
methods, and agents that appear in environmental law's formative sources and cases also
appear in labor law, tax law, immigration law, and a crowd of other regulatory fields.
These other fields have agencies that are "independent" in some sense, yet are checked
by both judicial and political review (to a greater or lesser extent), 44 state and local
regulators who also bear down on their subjects, 45 and hard choices of valuation and/or
propriety to make where the statutes that empower them are equivocal.
The feature of environmental law supposedly distinguishing it from other fields is
that it concerns "the environment" and how we value it. But if that is the field's
distinguishing feature, the one thing American environmental law ought to have is its

40. See e.g. Hasen, supra n. 30, at 339-357.
41. For example, Professor Johnston has argued that the best cost-benefit curves for global warming yet
derived-wherein costs are born disproportionately by Arctic, tropical, and island peoples and actual benefits
accrue to middle-latitude and specifically North American places for decades to come-suggest that the 1970s
and 1980s legislating coalitions that enacted the CAA could not possibly have meant to force rapid reductions
of greenhouse gases in the U.S. this century. See Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the
Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1, 9-56 (2008). Of course, that interpretation of the Act is easily overcome with the right
"canons" of interpretation-normative canons, that is. Cf Bamberger, supra n. 24, at 111-113 (suggesting a
use of canons of constructions within the overarching framework of Chevron deference to reach normatively
superior ends).
42. Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less than Administrative Law:
A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildermuth, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloq. 32, 32 (2007).
43. Professor Adler (rightly) observes that the language of CAA § 202-mandating that the EPA "shall" set
emissions standards for "any air pollutant" it finds causes or contributes to air pollution "which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"-makes the "air pollutant" designation into a critical pivot.
Adler, supra n. 42, at 35-38. Once greenhouse gases were labeled as such, the underlying consensus on global
warming virtually guaranteed an "endangerment" finding of some kind. Id. And, if Natl. Resources Def
Council v. Train, 545 F.2d 320, 325-326 (2d Cir. 1976), is read to control Title 11of the Act as it does Title 1,
the endangerment finding is, in effect, a mandate to set applicable standards, as well. The only gap in this logic
is timing--how long the EPA has to do all of this before a court compels it to act-and the diversity of the
federal judiciary that would hear any such plea for relief. In my view, these are substantial gaps.
44. See generally Guide, supra n. 25.
45. See generally Preemption Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism's Core Question
(William W. Buzbee ed., Cambridge U. Press 2009).
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own normative principle or canon of interpretation that produces correct, appropriate, or
just better valuations of nature in some sort of systematic way. And the field has no such
principle. Indeed, given an institutional structure wherein courts and administrative
agencies now struggle with each other to avoid the responsibility of authoringAmerica's
environmental values, the prospects seem slim for such a principle ever solidifying in our
federal environmental law. Part II uses Entergy v. Riverkeeper,46 one of the CWA cases
from last Term, to make the point.
II.

ENTERGY: A HYDRA THAT WOULD NOT DIE?

For as long as we have had statutory behemoths like the CAA and the CWA, we
have had arguments over the role that costs and practicability ought to play in how they
are implemented. There has never been any shortage of partisans on either side of the
struggle. 4 7 These statutes each delegate power to the EPA by authorizing it to prohibit or
mediate behaviors of a certain kind which it finds too risky given the probabilities of
harmful consequences.48 Before it can act, however, the EPA normally must make
certain required findings or determinations based on evidence and usually according to
disparate criteria fixed (or implied) by the underlying statute(s) and subject to judicial
review. 49 And for as long as the EPA has been making these determinations, advocates
have been charging it with illicitly considering factors the statutes exclude, ignoring
factors the statutes prefer or mandate, or employing some otherwise mistaken method of
choice that demands judicial reversal. 50
Not surprisingly, these programs have become-with help from contemporary
administrative law-entrenched in the parametric controversies of epidemiological
inference,51 cost/benefit analysis,52 time discounting, 53 the metaphysics of statistical
lives, 54 and a slew of other ethical dilemmas that arise when we try to quantify and
regulate risk. As many times as efforts to quantify the important variables in these
debates have been dismissed as ill-conceived or inherently biased, though, they keep
coming back with enhanced rigor and, thus, broader appeal-demonstrating an

46. 129 S.Ct. 1498.
47. See generally John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 395 (2008); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Risk Regulation at Risk: Restoring a
PragmaticApproach (Stanford U. Press 2003).
48. See e.g. Nail. Research Council, Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment 26-58 (Natl.
Academies Press 2009) (describing the evolution and use of risk assessment at the EPA).
49. See generally Guide, supra n. 25.
50. As the Supreme Court observed in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
Ins. Co., an agency's rulemaking is normally "arbitrary and capricious" under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) where "the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider . . . offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." 463 U.S. 29, 41, 43 (1983).
51. See generally Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Causation and Causal Inference in
Epidemiology, 95 Amer. J. Pub. Health 144 (2005).
52. See generally Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law and Environment 32-35 (2d
ed., Cambridge U. Press 2008).
53. See generally Risk Versus Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (John D. Graham
& Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., Harv. U. Press 1995).
54. See generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and
the Value ofNothing 44-47 (The New Press 2004).
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unparalleled "staying power." 55 Quantification keeps coming back stronger than ever,
often with counterintuitive results. 5 6 Indeed, even standing doctrine could be submerged
in the details of risk quantification and what they ought to mean to traditional legal
concepts. 57 Much to environmental nonprofits' chagrin, though, the Court may have
rejected such "probabilistic" injury theories in Earth Island Institute v. Summers.5 8 (A
robust commitment to quantify has no particular friend or foe in the circus!)
EPA leads all federal agencies in its use of quantified risk- and cost-benefit
analyses, perhaps reflecting the nature of the decisions it has been delegated. 59 A recent
report from the National Research Council recommended keeping EPA's time-tested
dichotomization of risk assessment and risk management, wherein cost-benefit balancing
is conducted after a risk is assessed as a kind of "decision-support product" for risk
managers (who should play no role in risk assessments).60 That conclusion was reached
despite great foment surrounding risk-benefit analysis and, especially, surrounding
"regulatory review" of action agencies like EPA by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs.61 But the essence of the foment comes down to the trite observation
that it matters a great deal who quantifies and balances the disparate choice factors at
work in modem environmental law. 62
Large power plants concentrate some of the worst environmental harms our
societies generate. Besides the harms from the extraction and transportation of their
fuels, the air and water pollution most of them generate (many at disproportionate levels)
serve as stark reminders of the costs that attend the provision of so much electricity. Not
surprisingly, these plants' emission into the ambient air of sulfur- and nitrogen-oxides,
particulate matter, mercury and other trace metals, and a variety of organic compounds
from the combustion of their fuels have occupied U.S. environmental lawyers for

55. See e.g. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundationsof Cost-Benefit Analysis 1-2 (Harv. U.
Press 2006); Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis
Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health (Oxford U. Press 2008).
56. So-called "cost-benefit analysis," for example-so often denounced as a tool of the "deregulatory"
agenda-actually justifies a relatively immediate, robust, and economy-wide deployment of many greenhouse
gas reduction technologies. See Hannah Choi Granade et al., Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the US. Economy
1-5, http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/US-energy efficiency full report.pdf (July 2009).
57. See Bradford Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 Ecol.
L.Q. 665 (2009); see also Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of StatisticalPeople, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 189-207
(2000).
58. See Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151-1152. Prior to Summers, a probabilistic future injury to unknown
plaintiff-members had sufficed against standing challenges in: Maine People's Alliance and Nat. Resources
Def Council v. Mallinckrodt 471 F.3d 277 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 93 (2007); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000); Ecological Rights Round v.
Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2000); and also in Mountain States Legal Fund v. Glickman, 92
F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The Court's rejection of "statistical standing" for so-called "facial" challenges to
agency rules in Summers was arguably dicta because the plaintiffs did not assert a claim of statistical standing.
Thus, the Court's considered judgment may still be forthcoming.
59. See Natil. Research Council, supran. 48, at 16.
60. See id at 66. That structure traces to the National Research Council's own 1983 report. See id at 48.
61. Cf id. at 269 ("The committee is mindful of concerns about political interference in the process, and the
framework [proposed] maintains the conceptual distinction between risk assessment and risk management
articulated in [1983]."); see also Lisa Heinzerling, MarketsforArsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2311 (July 2002).
62. See e.g. Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.. 433, 446-462 (2008) (purporting to criticize cost-benefit analysis as
such but ultimately conceding its permanence and settling on a critique of its conduct by uninformed people).
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decades.63 Likewise, their emissions of sediment, toxics, and the same organic
compounds into our waters have occupied (other) U.S. environmental lawyers for
decades.64 And one subchapter of that story is the cooling water these plants use to
regulate their thermal balances-cooling water most of them withdraw from neighboring
65
surface waters that they then return, usually in a significantly warmer state.
These massive withdrawals of water annually "entrain" billions of fish larvae and
micro-organisms, killing them, and trap millions of larger fish which are vacuumed onto
the screens covering the intakes and killed.66 Section 316(b) directed the EPA to set
standards for these "cooling water intake structures" that "reflect the best technology
67
available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." The first effort to do so
ended in a misfire, the Fourth Circuit having found procedural fault with EPA's
rulemaking.68 The next version, occasioned by another lawsuit,69 came before the
Second Circuit in two pieces 70 and then to the Supreme Court last Term. A quick
overview of the choices framed up in EPA's rulemaking will suffice.
Three basic types of cooling technology have been in use for decades: oncethrough (what it sounds like), closed-cycle (cycled reuse of the same water), and socalled dry-cooling (what it sounds like). 7 1 With the exception of dry-cooling, the
technologies are distinguished by the volumes of water used. What the "best available"
technology is for minimizing the "adverse environmental impact" of existing power
plants hinges, of course, on the value(s) for which one is optimizing. While dry-cooling
essentially eliminates impingement and entrainment of aquatic organisms, it comes at a
substantial cost-an energy penalty-and increases greenhouse gas emissions, perhaps
substantially. Closed-cycle cooling technologies were projected to achieve variable rates
of impingement/entrainment mortality reduction (between 72 and 98%) depending on the
facility.72 But they were also projected to cost several billion dollars nationwide and

63. See Nail. Research Council, Air Quality Management in the UnitedStates 174-215 (Natil. Acad. Press
2004).
64. See e.g. Robert W. Adler et al., The Clean Water Act 20 Years Later (Nat. Resources Def. Council
1993). Certainly in some cases the same lawyers do the air work as well as the water work-but not necessarily
so.
65. In 1973, the first time EPA set about to regulate these harms, it determined that power plants and other
large industrial facilities combined to withdraw roughly 70 trillion gallons of cooling water annually. 38 Fed.
Reg. 34409, 34410 (Dec. 13, 1973). By the time the rulemaking at issue in Entergy was underway, that number
had risen to over 100 trillion gallons annually.
66. See 66 Fed. Reg. 65256, 65262-652263, 65292 (Dec. 18, 2001).
67. See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
68. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977). The court held that a "Development
Document" underlying the rule's design specifications should have been published in the Federal Register and
was not. Id at 457. It remanded the rule to the agency and the agency never followed up with a repromulgation of the rule.
69. See Cronin v. Browner, 898 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (enjoining the EPA to initiate CWA §
316(b) rulemaking).
70. See Riverkeeper Inc v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2004) [hereinafeter Riverkeeper 1]; Riverkeeper, Inc.
v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Riverkeeper II]. Riverkeeper I dealt with the rules applicable to
new facilities while Riverkeeper I dealt with the rules applicable to existing facilities. Id. at 91-93.
71. James R. May & Maya K. van Rossum, The Quick and the Dead: Fish Entrainment, Entrapment, and
the Implementation and Application of Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 373, 378-379
(1995).
72. 67 Fed. Reg. 17122, 17189 (April 9, 2002).
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result in the closure of about nine power plants. 7 3 EPA finally chose to array the varieties
of closed-cycle and once-through technologies along a spectrum, allowing for different
screening mechanisms around the intake structures themselves, and required that every
installation somehow meet a performance standard of 80-95% reduction in
impingement74 together with a 60-90% reduction in entrainment 75 beyond some facilityset baseline. This, the agency maintained, balanced the costs and benefits of
impingement/entrainment reduction together with other "adverse environmental
impact."76

In reviewing the rulemaking, the Second Circuit held that CWA § 316(b)'s "best
technology available" (BTA) standard more resembled the CWA's "best available
technology" (BAT) standards than it did other CWA standards and that, because the
courts have interpreted the BAT provisions as constraining the consideration of costs,
§ 316(b) did, too.7 7 Fair enough. In one sense, though, this was a curious holding.
Technological "availability" is almost certainly an ambiguous statutory standard.78 The
EPA could even point to the single occurrence in the legislative record where § 316(b)
was ever expressly mentioned to support its conclusion that relative costs must factor
into any determination that a technology is "available." 79 A court purporting either to (1)
read the CWA strictly, or (2) defer to the reasonableinterpretations of the agency, would
run headlong into that barrier. 80 And the Second Circuit recognized as much. 8 1 So,
73. Id. at 17155. In the finalized rule, the cost projections for mandating closed-cycle cooling rose to $3.5
billion per year. 69 Fed. Reg. 41576, 41605 (July 9, 2004).
74. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b)(1) (2008).
75. Id. at § 125.94(b)(2).
76. Aggregating the total environmental harm and the propensity of a water pollution control standard to
simply shift the harms to other media are perennial subjects of dispute under the Act's Subchapter III. See e.g.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1044-1053 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
77. CWA § 316(b) actually cross-references both § 301 and § 306-provisions of the statute requiring the
setting of most other types of CWA technology standard. The precedents where reviewing courts have
scrutinized the use of cost and feasibility information in setting those other standards are numerous and open to
conflicting interpretations. See e.g. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
that EPA permitted to avoid indefinitely imposing technologies that would be cost-prohibitive to some
facilities); Texas Oil & Gass Assn. v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that EPA must give
decreasing weight to cost considerations as dischargers are permitted longer intervals of time to install retrofit
technologies to meet standards); and Weyerhaeuser Co., 590 F.2d 1011 (holding that cost considerations in a
variance from the general standards are appropriately broken down to a facility-by-facility approach only if the
same substantive standards of "availability" are employed). In Riverkeeper I, the court of appeals held,
consistent with several past precedents, that the BTA standard allows EPA to consider cost, "but only in a
limited fashion and not as a primary consideration." Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 99 (characterizing the holding
of Riverkeeper 1). In Riverkeeper II, the court held as much for the Phase II rules (the rules for existing
facilities), and expanded that holding's specificity by remanding to the EPA so that it could "explain its
conclusions" that led it to undertake the cost-benefit analysis it apparently undertook. Id. at 98-103.
78. See Entergy, 129 S.Ct. at 1506 n.5 ("Respondents concede that the term "available" is ambiguous, as it
could mean either technologically feasible or economically feasible.").
79. See Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 101 ("The EPA took this 'economically practicable' concept
[underlying its interpretation of 'available' in CWA § 316(b)] directly from the text of a floor speech of a
single representative-the only specific reference to § 316(b) in the congressional debates.").
80. It would be insufficient to claim that "precedent" bound the Second Circuit to interpret CWA § 316(b)
as it did. As the Supreme Court has made clear, prior precedent constrains an agency only to the extent that the
court has held the statutory provision in question to have an unambiguous meaning and § 316(b) was not at
issue in any of the prior BAT cases. See Nail. Cable & Telecomm. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967 (2004).
81. This perhaps explains why the court allowed that the agency could consider costs up to the supposed
threshold at which the rulemaking became "cost-driven" instead of "technology-driven." Riverkeeper II, 475
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rather than rule that the EPA improperly considered the relative efficiencies of the
various technologies, it resorted to an old judicial gambit: it held that the Agency had not
sufficiently explained its deliberations and that it was "difficult for judges or interested
parties to determine the propriety of the Agency's action without a justification for the
82
action supported by clearly identified substantial evidence whose import is explained."
The court remanded for that better explanation83 and certain regulated parties sought
review from the Supreme Court. 84
Of course, CWA § 316(b) does not explicitly state what choice factors ought to be
weighed when the EPA sets its standard(s). Interpreting "availability" in the context of
cooling water withdrawals, though, almost certainly involves weighing apples and
oranges: when/how does dry-cooling technology become "unavailable"? For example,
how much more carbon dioxide is too much for the aquatic mortality/morbidity that
mandatory dry-cooling would avert? We could quantify these variables quite precisely,
but we would still face some rather tricky problems of commensurability. Moreover, the
harms from the greenhouse effect will almost certainly befall different people than the
harms from more impingement/entrainment. For all its perceived illegitimacy,85 thus, the
monetization of relative costs and benefits in such contexts is arguably the essence of
rationality-at least in its standard sense-because it seeks to unite the relevant choice
factors under a single measuring variable.86 Money is an obviously inadequate metric for
the things that matter most. But whether the EPA's interpretation was a "reasonable"
interpretation of a statute that does not close the list of permissible choice factors hinges
on much more than the inadequacy of money as a metric. It hinges on the kind of agent
the EPA is, the possibilities for its actions, and, more specifically, the precise method
employed to do the actual weighing for the simple reason that the law supplies no default
rules of method in this context. 87 Many foundational provisions in the CWA, CAA, and
other environmental statutes leave the list of permissible choice factors open just as
§ 316(b) did, either by using language like "including" or by being deliberately vague.8 8
F.3d at 99.
82. Id. at 104. 1 assume that the use of "substantial evidence" in the quoted passage was a casual, nontechnical usage. If it was intended to suggest the rulemaking was subject to "substantial evidence" review
pursuant either to the CWA or the APA, that holding was clearly erroneous. For an in-depth look at the 'better
explanation' gambit, see Jerry Mashaw & David Harfst, The Strugglefor Auto Safety (Harv. U. Press 1990).
83. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 103.
84. Entergy, 129 S.Ct. at 1502 n. 1 (2009).
85. See Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1355,1373
(2009) (arguing that there is a legitimacy gap in the use of cost-benefit analysis).
86. See e.g. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality 175-216
(Cambridge U. Press 1989) (contrasting parameterization of relevant variables to the "radical cognitive
indeterminacy" of multi-factored social choices left to the intuition of all possible decision-makers).
87. Even the dissent in Entergy argued not that a clear and relevant rule of law precluded the EPA's use of
cost-benefit analysis in general but, rather, that a "fair" interpretation of the CWA and its legislative history
excluded the analysis in this exact context. Entergy, 129 S.Ct. at 1516 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Breyer's separate concurrence made no mention of default rulesor canons of interpretation-which would ensure the consideration of costs when statutory language was as
"deliberately nuanced" as CWA § 316(b). See id. at 1512 (Breyer, J., concurring). Entergy was perhaps the
ideal case through which to press such a default rule given Justice Breyer's long-standing objections to
agencies' "tunnel vision" and consequent skewing of their perspectives on risk regulation. See e.g. Stephen
Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Cycle (Hary. U. Press 1993).
88. The factoring that actually goes into agency standard-setting in such contexts is, thus, often shielded
from public view. See Patricia Ross McCubbin, The Risk in Technology-BasedStandards, 16 Duke Envtl. L. &
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Not surprisingly, given its nature (and especially with respect to the CWA's opaque
conceptual structure on point89 ), EPA's standards have wavered in their stringency. 90
Still, given the Supreme Court's case law on the point, the "environmentalists" 9 1
who oppose the consideration of "cost" in decisions like EPA's cooling water intake
structures rulemaking must answer the following question: if not cost or other metrics
that quantify the variables comprising such decisions, then what? One supposed
alternative still in vogue among many is a so-called "feasibility" approach: is the
standard being set "feasible" for the market actors it governs? 92 But this just subtly shifts
the factors of choice regulators must weigh from a relatively standard assessment of
project costs and expected benefits to an assessment of the ingenuity and sincerity of
regulated actors when we ask them whether they can achieve x, y, or z. 93 That kind of
assessment, in other words, boosts the influence of the weakest elements of traditional
cost-benefit analyses, increasing the information burdens on regulators and arguably
strengthening the hands of the regulated. 94
More importantly, if environmental law aims merely to blunt the consequences of
practices like our widespread provision of electricity, then weighing costs and benefits is
probably inevitable. The standard account of this entailment is that there are simply too
many such practices and too little societal will (or capital) to invest in blunting their
consequences. 95 That is what so often returns us to a project-oriented cost-benefit
analysis in regulatory decision-making. 96 But another way to characterize that necessity
is with the burden of proof. Arguments against the use of quantified costs and benefits in
such decisions normally reduce down to the following: (1) monetized variables are much
Policy Forum 1 (2005).
89. See e.g. E.I Du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (construing Subchapter III and finding
that it was meant to allow the EPA to create industry-by-industry standards binding on all members of covered
industries that control their pollution based on assessments of their context and competition).
90. See Wesley A. Magat et al., Rules in the Making: A StatisticalAnalysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior
1 (RFF Press 1986). After multiple regression analyses and a robust sample set, Magat and colleagues
concluded that neither efficiency nor equity accounted very well for the substantial variations in the "best
practicable technology" standards the EPA was setting under CWA §§ 301 and 306. Id. at 154.
91. Riverkeeper and its allies challenging the "Phase II" cooling water intake rules called themselves the
"environmental" petitioners, as if it was a good strategic move to turn the matter into the partisan struggle of
some who defend "the environment" against others who defile it. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d at 96 n. 8.
92. See e.g. David M. Driesen, Distributingthe Costs of Environmental,Health, and Safety Protection: The
FeasibilityPrinciple,Cost-Benefit Analysis, andRegulatory Reform, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
93. To accept that this inquiry is somehow "cost sensitive" while arguing that it is not driven by cost (as
then-Judge Sotomayor did in her opinion for the panel in Riverkeeper II), Riverkeeper seems to concede most
of the ground taken by cost-benefit analysis's critics. Riverkeeper II, F.3d at 99; see generally Dreisen, supra n.
92 at 11. Moreover, whether a technology is, in concept, "feasible" will inevitably involve regulators in exactly
the kinds of inquiry for which no experts-living or dead-have ever existed. Cf Howard Latin, Ideal Versus
Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Unform Standardsand "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 1267 (1985) (arguing that the mere mortals who comprise regulatory agencies normally work best
when optimizing for a strictly limited number of concerns).
94. See Jamison E. Colburn, The FutureofAir Pollution Control in the CorporatistState, 34 Envtl. L. Rptr.
10577, 10590-10594 (2004).
95. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law and the Environment (Cambridge U. Press
2002).
96. Cf Revesz and Livermore, supra n. 55, at 12-13 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is the most rational
way to prioritize and select actions against risk). Indeed, risk-benefit balancing funded from a limited
"budget"-either of federal appropriations or from a hypothetical fund of societal will-is perhaps the only
kind of risk-benefit balancing done in democratic societies today. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of
Democracy: A Cultural EvaluationofSunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (2006).
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less determinate than they seem and they obscure the distributive aspects of most
choices; (2) monetization requires that we put a price on the priceless (like healthy
streams or clean air); and (3) quantitative analysis generally excludes the public from the
processes of government because it is so opaque. Each of these is an important objection
to cost-benefit analysis as it too often has been practiced. Yet the actual argument these
critiques obscure-the argument that progressives still hope to avoid-is whether
quantification with metrics like expenditures versus increments of harm-prevention can
be used to improve the making of necessarily tragic decisions. And it is virtually
impossible to prove the negative that such techniques cannot improve our decision
making. 97 Progressives hope to avoid that purer form of the argument because they do
not concede that the "circus" we call environmental law is just about blunting (some of)
the harsher consequences of American life. As currently institutionalized, though, this is
self-evidently our environmental law's horizon. Thus, whatever flaws characterized
EPA's decisionmaking process on cooling water technologies (and there were many),
they had more to do with the precise values EPA assigned to its variables (too many of
which were assigned no value) than with quantification per se.98 And that sort of
objection is likely to: (1) lose in court under prevailing deference doctrines; 99 (2) excite
fewer donors in the environmentalists' struggles against "evil"; 100 and, therefore, (3)
require a far more robust investment of human and other capital resources to mount
effectively.
As it happened, the psuedo-question the Entergy litigants brought to the Court
ended up looking close: a 5-1-3 split. A cynic views how these questions are being
processed as precisely what our "lawmakers" seek: ambiguous statutory delegations and
a lack of binding default rules which combine to empower individual parties (or
politicians who have appropriation or other powers over the subject agencies) to
maximize their influence therein. 10 1 The cynic looks at this circus and sees "iron
triangles," 1 02 bureaucratic turf wars, 10 3 repeat players who's special interest is "the
97. Cf Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 1-24 (Harv. U.
Press 2006) (making the justification out in this way). Indeed, if anything, it is a further, better quantification
that will enable the public to recognize and agree to address lingering distributional and meta-ethical issues.
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
1260, 1324-1329 (2006).
98. Virtually any of nature's parts or functions can be valued-in one way or another. See A. Myrick
Freeman Ill, The Measurement of Environmentaland Resource Values (2d ed., RFF Press 1993). The fact that
money is an inadequate measure for many of them does not, however, render the valuation suspect root and
branch. The price of admission to an amusement park is no measurement of the joy it brings to a toddler's heart
to ride the merry-go-round, but that is hardly reason to change the price of admission.
99. See e.g. Natl. Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
100. See e.g. Ted Nordhaus & Michael Shellenberger, Break Through: From the Deathof Environmentalism
to the Politics of Possibility 201-204 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2007) (Critiquing the dominant modes of fundraising used by environmental nonprofits as unnecessary scare-mongering wherein certain enemies of the
environment are publicly targeted.).
101. See e.g. Steven P. Croley, Regulation and Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulator
Government 17 (Princeton U. Press 2008) (calling this the "cynical" view of institutional settings like CWA
§ 316(b)). "Political" influence can be both congressional and Presidential in origin. See e.g. John Ferejohn &
Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L., Econ., & Org. 1 (1990); Elena Kagan,
PresidentialAdministration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001).
102. See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 118-119
(Basic Books 1989).
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environment,"l 04 and just the plain-old evasion of our Madisonian heritage. 05
Minimalisticjukes and jibes just look like the judiciary's dominant strategy. 106
Worse still, there seems to be no conclusive answer to this cynical interpretation.
The more often our hard questions of priorities and valuation blow up into major battles,
as occurred over cooling water intakes (where a majority of the Court returned to its
supposed rule of "deference" to agency interpretation 07), the less able we seem to be to
collaborate on the harder, more detail-oriented work of accurately quantifying all the
variables that rightly enter the consideration of environmental harms and their avoidance.
It is at these points that we stop collaborating to produce more and/or better information
and shift instead to a different kind of interactivity: the interactions where we draw up
into factions that are internally confident, united, and too often wrong.los In short, the
conflict over psuedo-questions primes people to misunderstand their putative
"adversaries" and miss opportunities to collaborate rather than contend and contest.
III.

A

WINTER OF DISCONTENT: MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION GOES TO WAR?

Like so many of our threats to nature's composition and function, high energy
"active" SONAR empowers us to do some rather extraordinary things. Locating and
tracking an ultra-quiet submarine at distance, for example, has become a critical element
of sea warfare (and, thus, a deterrent to sea warfare) precisely because our navy has
gotten good at it. 109 The trouble is the collateral damage to the marine environment.
Researchers have traced firm causal connections between this SONAR and serious harms
to different sea creatures, especially whales. 1 10 Different elements of the government
have studied this conflict between military preparedness and marine mammal protection
for years.111

The evidence mounted so quickly recently that even the Navy

103. William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracyand Representative Government 36-42 (Aldine, Atherton 1971).
104. See e.g. Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, in
Political Environmentalism: Going Behind the Green Curtain 1 (Terry L. Anderson ed., Hoover Instn. Press
2000).
105. Cf James Madison, The FederalistNo. 51, in The FederalistPapers 318-319 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
Signet 1999) ("The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department,
consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal
motives to resist encroachments of the others.").
106. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harv.
U. Press 1999).
107. Entergy, 129 S.Ct. at 1510 ("We conclude that the EPA permissibly relied on cost-benefit analysis in
setting the national performance standards and in providing for cost-benefit variances from those standards as
part of the Phase II regulations.").
108. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge 52-65 (Oxford U. Press
2006) (A key aspect of group deliberation is the promotion of uniformity by decreasing the range of views
within groups.).
109. The U.S. Navy maintains that active SONAR is vital to its sea warfare strategies today given the
proliferation of submarine technology and the increased "geopolitical" probability that future maritime battles
will be fought in near-shore waters. See U.S. Navy, Understanding Sonar, http://www.navy.mil/oceans/
history.html (last accessed March 22, 2010). Active sonar generates powerful pulses of sound and then listens
to that sound travel through aquatic space. Id. Other sources seem to corroborate the Navy's account. See e.g.
Gordon D. Tyler, Jr., The Emergence of Low-Frequency Active Acoustics as a CriticalAntisubmarine Warfare
Technology, 13 Johns Hopkins APL Technical Dig. 145 (1992).
110. See Nat. Resources Def Council v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 665-667 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing the
literature).
111. See e.g. Dept. of Commerce & Sec. of the Navy, Jr.Interim Rep. Bahamas Marine Mammal Stranding
Event of 15-16 March 2000 (Dec. 2001) (available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/health/
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institutionalized environmental reviews for (most) peace-time uses of active SONAR in
an effort to minimize that damage. 1 12
But who is to say when the disruption and damage outweigh the marginal
improvements in naval preparedness they bring? That was the substantive issue behind
Winter v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc.,113 a case that reached the Court as a
question of preliminary injunctions (PIs) and their availability for alleged violations of
three separate statutes-the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).1 4 Thinly
veiled by certain doctrinal details, in other words, the underlying risks shot through the
litigation from the outset. The Navy had planned a series of active SONAR exercises and
it had determined in an "environmental assessment" (EA)-as allowed under the NEPA
guidelines 1i-that by observing its own mitigation measures during its exercises, it
would not cause a "significant impact" on the environment, thereby avoiding the duty to
prepare a full environmental impact statement (EIS).116 Indeed, avoiding NEPA's
required impact statements through such a "mitigated FONSI" (Finding Of No
Significant Impact) has become commonplace. 117
Because the exercises were imminent, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) sought a PI. Now, according to the Winter majority, a plaintiff seeking a PI
must establish: (1) that s/he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that s/he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of
equities tips in his or her favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.118 And
Winter seems to have cut at least some ice in that the Supreme Court (finally) explicitly

strandingbahamas2000.pdf; U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., Defense Acquisitions: Testing Needed to Prove
SURTASS/LFA Effectiveness in Littoral Waters (June 10, 2002) (available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02692.pdf).
112. The Natural Resources Defense Council played a commendable role in that process. See e.g. Michael
Jasny, Sounding the Depths: Supertankers, Sonar, and the rise of Undersea Noise (Nat. Resources Def.
Council 1999); Michael Jasny et al., Sounding the Depths II: The Rising Toll of Sonar, Shipping andIndustrial
Ocean Noise on Marine Life vii (Nat. Resources Def. Council 2005).
113. 129 S.Ct. 365 (2008).
114. These were the claims for injunctive relief that were originally pursued in the case. See Nat. Resources
Def Counci v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
115. See e.g. GreenpeaceAction v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that an agency
could rely on the mitigative effects of its own adopted measures to reach a finding of "no significant impact"
that then cancelled its responsibility to generate an EIS, consistent with 40 C.F.R. § 1506). The Ninth Circuit
was hardly a pioneer when it first accepted this mitigated FONSI as an alternative to an EIS. See Albert I.
Herson, Project Mitigation Revisited: Most Courts Approve Findings of No Significant Impact Justified by
Mitigation, 13 Ecol. L.Q. 51 (1986).
116. See Winter, 518 F.3dat660-662.
117. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's
Environmental Performance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 928 (2002). As the Solicitor General observed in its
petition for certiorari, the EA/FONSI in this case was extensive (293 pages) and was accompanied by a
"consistency determination" under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A)-(C) (2006),
a National Defense Exemption under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f) (2006), a 'nojeopardy' biological opinion under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2006),
and an extensive informal consultative process between the Council on Environmental Quality and the
Department of the Navy. See Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Winter, 129 S.Ct. 365 (available at 2008 WL 859374)
[hereinafter Petition]. Given their conclusions and supposed biases, however, none of this analysis was going to
convince NRDC that the Navy had accurately assessed the factors involved.
118. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (citing Munafv. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207 (2008); Amoco Prod Co. v. Gambell,
480 U.S. 531, 532 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982)).
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endorsed this four-factored test, perhaps even turning the four factors into elements.1 19
Long thought to reside in the "sound discretion" of the district courts,120 the very
availability of a PI "recognizes that the task of protecting legal entitlements cannot be
postponed until the conclusion of the litigation concerning the assignment of those
entitlements."1 2 1
Applying these disparate choice factors to actual cases and doing so in a hurry,
however, can be challenging. Thus, the supply of PI's is notoriously uneven,122 subject
to misappropriation,123 and of a perennially-questioned legal pedigree.124 In the
winding, grinding proceedings of the whale/SONAR litigation, NRDC had convinced a
federal court that the Navy-indeed, that the President of the United States (who
ultimately issued a special exemption under the MMPA 125)-had misinterpreted the law
so badly as to merit a PI not once, but twice. 12 6 The Solicitor General then convinced the
Supreme Court to hear the Navy's appeal and balance the factors for itself. In November
2008, based on its deference to the Navy and "the documented risks to national security"
should the SONAR exercises be postponed, the Court held that the factors "clearly"
weighed in favor of the Navy. 127 Characteristically, NRDC's attorneys have already
published a post-mortem accusing the Court of misapplying the law on preliminary
injunctions -28specifically, of giving insufficient weight to the probable harms NRDC
had alleged while giving too much weight to the Navy's claims of national security 29
119. The circuit split before Winter involved some courts having adopted a more traditional use of the listed
factors and some courts having molded those factors into a unitary "sliding" scale. See Richard R.W. Brooks &
Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58
Stan. L. Rev. 381, 388-394 (2005). The Winter majority, however, said that the plaintiff must "establish" each
of the four factors, and that sounds much more like an elements approach. Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374; cf Brooks
& Schwartz, supra n. 119, at 409 (observing that the availability of PIs can either make them more like liability
rules or more like property rules and that the tests used to assign P1's ought to reflect the value of the PI to the
movant by requiring a movant to pay for damages the PI may create).
120. See Morton Denlow, The Motion for a PreliminaryInjunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard,
22 Rev. Litig. 495, 533 (2003). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 states that" [N]o preliminary injunction
shall be issued without notice to the adverse party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). But Rule 65 "does not provide
much guidance" on the appropriateness of preliminary injunctions. Denlow, supra n. 120, at 504.
121. Brooks & Schwartz, supra n. 119, at 384.
122. See e.g. John Leubsdorf, The Standardfor PreliminaryInjunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1978).
123. See Denlow, supra n. 120, at 533 ("The failure to adopt [a uniform] standard has led to confusion by the
courts and possible forum shopping by parties.").
124. Weinberger, 456 U.S. 305, for example, was a case involving the denial of injunctive relief for no given
reason other than some ineffable balance of equities. See e.g. Jason David Fregeau, Statutes and Judicial
Discretion:Against the Law ... Sort Of, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 501 (1991).
125. Petition, supran. 117, at 10-11.
126. Following the issuance of the first PI, the Navy filed an immediate appeal and the Ninth Circuit issued a
stay pending that appeal. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, 862. Following the briefing and a hearing, the Ninth Circuit
sustained the PI but ordered that it be modified to allow the Navy to proceed with its training exercises in
"mitigated" form. Winter, 508 F.3d 885, 887. On remand to the district court, Judge Cooper amended but
upheld the order and then was asked to reconsider in light of the President's specially-issued "National Defense
Exemption" under the MMPA and CEQ's specially-issued exemption under its NEPA Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §
1506.11. See Winter, 527 F. Supp.2d at 1221-1224. That request was denied. Id. at 1238. In rejecting an appeal
from the denial, the Ninth Circuit panel notably took the opportunity to reiterate its own rather unique
interpretation of NEPA as to the avoidance of impact statements. See Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 687-696; infra
notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
127. Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 381 n. 5.
128. See Joel Reynolds et al., No Whale of a Tale: Legal Implications of Winter v. NRDC, 36 Ecol. L. Q.
753 (2009).
129. Id. at 762-767. The basic error alleged in the article is that the Court paid insufficient deference to the
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while simultaneously evading the substantive questions. 130
It may be helpful, though, to recall the underlying violation of law the plaintiffs
alleged (which the district court adjudicated and which the Ninth Circuit upheld as the
chief predicate for the injunction): the Navy's use of an EA instead of the more detailed
EIS under NEPA. Now, if it was just the NEPA claim that gave rise to the PI, it is
demonstrably inaccurate to assert-as Justice Ginsburg may have in dissent1 3 1 -that
NEPA commanded the Navy to complete an EIS prior to its exercises. For most of its
forty years we have been reminded of NEPA's many shortcomings, including its
confinement to a purely "procedural" existence,132 its slippery jurisdictional terms, 133its
over- and under-inclusion, 134 and its often counterproductive structure. 135 And the
precise finding in Winter that led to the EA over the EIS-and which was challenged as
such-was that the environmental harms from the mitigated SONAR exercises were of
district court and its comparatively "expert" fact-finding capacities. While some deference was probably
appropriate under the governing standard of review, the Supreme Court has made clear repeatedly that it will
decide for itself on the legal issues underlying any grant of a preliminary injunction. See e.g. McLucas v.
DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1975); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). Whether this
independence of judgment is justified or not, it was hardly unprecedented that the Court paid little-to-no
deference to the lower courts in Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365.
130. Reynolds et al., supra n. 128, at 772 ("The Supreme Court's opinion leaves unanswered a number of
broader questions posed by the Navy's position [like] the limits of judicial deference to military claims in
NEPA cases when, in its view, national security is threatened[.]").
131. "If the Navy had completed the EIS before taking action, as NEPA instructs, the parties and the public
could have benefited from the environmental analysis-and the Navy's training could have proceeded without
substantial interruption." Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Reynolds and colleagues make
this out to be Justice Ginsburg's major point of departure from the majority. Reynolds et al., supra n. 128, at
770-771. Yet neither Justice Ginsburg nor Reynolds et al. specify where this command of NEPA's can be
found. In fact, nowhere does NEPA § 102 define its operative terms-the causing of a "significant effect" on
the "human environment." 42 U.S.C § 4331 (2006). CEQ's Guidelines-which are authoritative and, for all
practical purposes, binding (even though they were authored under a contrary expectation)-provide none of
the clarity that NEPA warriors have so long advocated. See e.g. Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primeron an 'Old'
Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 Envtl. L. Rptr. 10060, 10064 (stating that "disagreement about
whether a proposed action has 'significant effects' has been the most frequent reason for NEPA litigation" and
that "CEQ's regulations do not define which particular federal actions are 'significant,' " but instead identify a
list of factors for the agency to consider, including effects on the public and health and safety). We might,
indeed, go further and conjecture that Senator "Scoop" Jackson himself-a vocal supporter of the Vietnam War
who was sometimes disparaged as the "Senator from Boeing"-would have been surprised to learn that
mitigated military training exercises would necessitate the "detailed statement" his legislation created. For this
reason, I prefer to interpret the quoted passage from Justice Ginsburg's dissent not as addressed to the merits of
the underlying claim but rather as having assumed the lower courts' holdings on the motion for preliminary
injunction and perhaps as a reflection of the abbreviated record that accrued in the litigation.
132. See e.g. William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the
Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 Ind. L.J. 205 (1989); Matthew Lindstrom & Zachary A. Smith,
The National Environmental Policy Act: Judicial Misconstruction, Legislative Indifference & Executive
Neglect (Texas A&M U. Press 2001); Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 Okla. L. Rev. 239
(1973). Of course, good arguments have been made that, combined with administrative law's central tenets,
NEPA's procedures actually factor its underlying (substantive) concerns into agency deliberations in a deep
and meaningful way. See e.g. Jason J. Czamezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the US. Supreme
Court,Administrative Procedure,and the NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct, 25 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3 (2006).
133. See e.g. Thomas McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 801
(1977).
134. Karkkainen, supra n. 117, at 909-932; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Wither NEPA? 12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J.
333 (2004).
135. By naively assuming that future effects of actions can be predicted accurately and by only subjecting
these documents to ex ante "procedural" judicial review, NEPA arguably encourages agencies to "bullet proof'
their NEPA documents in anticipation of litigation, not necessarily to improve their predictive capacities. See
NEPA Task Forc, Rept. to the Council on Envtl. Quality: Modernizing NEPA Implementation (Sept. 2003)
(available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/reportlindex.html).
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unknown magnitude but were probably below NEPA's supposed "significance"
threshold. 136 The implicit threat lurking beneath that finding-which the Solicitor
General made manifest in its petition for certiorari-was that the Executive, at the time
"engaged in war, in two countries," had decided that an in-depth EA should suffice. The
government, in other words, focused the inquiry into the tradeoffs involved quite
narrowly: was the EIS (instead of an EA) really worth a preliminary injunction that
precluded exercises the Navy maintained were vital to military preparedness?
Interestingly enough, in the Ninth Circuit-unlike most other circuits-such a
decision to forego an EIS cannot follow from a finding that the effects of the action(s) in
question will be of uncertain significance.137 In other words, to conclude that an EIS is
not required by NEPA in the Ninth Circuit, the action agency must know that its
mitigation measures will be effective and will render the effects of the action
insignificant.138 Going back as early as 2001, a panel of the Ninth Circuit (expanding on
an earlier holding that involved "highly uncertain," "unique," and "unknown" risks)
maintained that an agency that lacks proofthat its mitigated actions will be insignificant
in effect must produce an EIS and not an EA. 139 And notwithstanding a footnote to the
contrary, that 2001 holding-which underlay the Ninth Circuit's holding in Winterarguably overruled an earlier Ninth Circuit precedent.140 That interpretation of NEPA
arguably transformed acknowledged uncertainties in forecasting into findings of
significant impact-a view of NEPA that adds substantially to the text of § 102 as
written. 14 1
So what is the force of such a precedent in weighing factors for the grant of a PI?
Surely there is ample reason to be suspicious of a court that turns uncertainty into an

136. See Winter, 527 F. Supp.2d at 1238 ('The Court is satisfied that its injunction stands firmly on NEPA
grounds."). The precedents on the "significantly" term and on its definition in the NEPA Guidelines are
voluminous, to say the least. See Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law andLitigation §§ 8.48-51 (2d ed., West
2007).
137. See Natl. Parks & Conserv. Assn. v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001); Winter, 518 F.3d at 687688.
138. While Babbitt cited a number of Ninth Circuit NEPA precedents in reaching this holding, including
Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998), Blue Mountains Biodiversity Proj. v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998), and Sierra Club v. US. Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988),
none of them involved the choice between a mitigated FONSI and an EIS, as was at issue in Babbitt. Thus,
none of them squarely addressed the precise issue of uncertainty in mitigation.
139. Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 733 ("The [agency] proposes to increase the risk of harm to the environment and
then perform its studies . . . . Before one brings about a potentially significant and irreversible change to the
environment, an EIS must be prepared that sufficiently explores the intensity of the environmental effects it
acknowledges." (citation omitted)).
140. See Franklin, 14 F.3d at 1335 (ruling that mitigation measures, even though of uncertain efficacy, can
serve to keep the action's "significance" level below the EIS threshold); but cf Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 732 n. 9
("GreenpeaceAction v. Franklin ... is not to the contrary.").
141. Babbitt has turned the Ninth Circuit uniquely skeptical of agency decisions to forego EIS's by way of a
"mitigated FONSI." Precedents in the D.C. Circuit and most of the other regional circuits have tended to view
such uses of uncertainty within a FONSI quite deferentially. In Babbitt and a series of cases involving National
Forest Management Act land planning, the Ninth Circuit has been spinning a web of barriers around the FONSI
'exit' from NEPA. Babbitt held that "the absence of currently available information does not excuse the
[agency] from preparing an EIS when there is a reasonable possibility that such information can be obtained in
connection with the preparatory process." Babbitt, 241 F.3d at 737. Certain panels of the Ninth Circuit cite it
routinely, most notably in Centerfor BiologicalDiversity v. Natl. Hwy. Traffic Admin., 508 F.3d 508, 558 (9th
Cir. 2007) (striking down a weak fiel economy rule for SUVs and light trucks because, among other things, the
National Highway Traffic Administration failed to prepare an EIS).
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obligation to generate an EIS, 142 especially where the action agency has (1) completed
an EA, (2) generated a mitigated-FONSI, and (3) committed to gathering more data on
the action or series of actions that NEPA alone-by acclamation-cannot prohibit in any
1 43
and a rule
event. NEPA is famously aimed at "better decisions, not better documents,"
144
Jarring
that requires an EIS in this context is not necessarily contributing to either.
where
even
and,
futures
uncertainties are ubiquitous in forecasting environmental
information is actually generated or better integrated for an EIS, "it appears that
is transmitted unfiltered from government
relatively little NEPA-generated 14information
5
to the citizenry and back again.",
So what is this interpretation's connection to NEPA? It makes a certain amount of
sense as an intuitive extension of NEPA's deliberative ethos (at least if you believe the
Executive is predisposed to avoiding deliberation in public). But ought the federal courts
to engage in that sort of remedial interpretive enterprise? The whale/SONAR litigation
casts it in an unfavorable light, at least. It is not that the values or other motivations
behind the Ninth Circuit's NEPA doctrine were especially exotic; it is not that its
especially
even
or
immodest
was
interpretation
statutory
normative
"countermajoritarian." It is its epistemic weaknesses that stand out. Institutionally, a
federal court is in no position to insist on this sort of prolonged executive branch
deliberation categorically, especially when the nation's defense preparations are the
tradeoff.146 And the Ninth Circuit's rule would perhaps be better justified if it were not
just the Ninth Circuit's rule.
If an EIS were capable of generating high quality information at little or no cost,
and could arrive in time to influence the agency decision, then an EIS might be
preferable to a mitigated FONSI. But if, as the evidence suggests, EISs are typically
costly, cumbersome, largely uninformative, and arrive too late in the process to shape the
real decision, then perhaps we could do with fewer of them-and all the more so if the
trade off is demonstrable environmental benefits arising from the mitigation measures

142. When reviewing the "significance" determination, courts must apply the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. See Marsh v. Or. Nat. Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989). This standard of
review is generally quite deferential, in large part because the determination is so likely to be uncertain. See
e.g. Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2003); Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Soc. Hill Towers Owners' Assn. v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2000); Natl. Audubon Socy. v.
Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1997); River Rd. Alliance Inc. v. Corps of Engrs. of US. Army, 764 F.2d 445,
448-449 (7th Cir. 1985); And on the precise question at issue in Babbitt-whether mitigation measures the
efficacy of which is uncertain may serve to keep an action's effects below NEPA's "significance" threshold-a
general notion of reasonableness also seems to be the norm. See Mandelker, supra n. 136, at § 8.49.
143. 40 C.F.R. 1502.15 (2006).
144. The use of a "categorical exclusion" by action agencies, for example, would easily nullify the Babbitt
doctrine with respect to covered actions-like SONAR exercises-and would almost certainly thereby lose
whatever information the Navy had committed to collecting in its "mitigated FONSI."
145. Karkkainen, supra n. 117,at 916 ("Far more frequently, organized groups serve as a mediating agent,
repackaging and translating the often highly technical information contained in an EIS for dissemination to the
broader citizenry, and offering their services as the vehicle through which citizens may attempt to hold their
government accountable.").
146. Cf Cabinet Mts. Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The agency concluded
the proposal as modified would not cause any significant environmental impacts. Appellants have not identified
any deficiencies in the agency's decision. For us to overturn it under these circumstances would require an
unjustifiable intrusion into the administrative process." (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat.
Resources Def Council, 435 U.S. 519, 556 (1978))).
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undertaken by agencies to avoid EIS production.14 7
Indeed, digging into NEPA and summoning its implications to motivate some kind
of permanently critical stance toward agency decision making is, as Professor Kalen has
observed, precisely what the D.C. Circuit had done-and precisely what the Supreme
Court so pointedly denounced-in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.14 8 Of course, administrative lawyers know all too well that
the Court itself is probably to blame for not having shut down just this kind of statutory
interpretation in Vermont Yankee. 14 9 The Second Circuit's "better explanation" gambit
in Entergy, for example, was precisely the Court's own move in Massachusetts v. EPA:
the Court denied, after all, that it was forcing EPA to regulate green house gases (GHGs)
by holding that GHGs are "air pollutants" under the CAA.1 50 And Massachusetts
perhaps imposed a measure of accountability that would otherwise have been lost in
EPA's twisted approach to GHGs. 15 1 But at what cost to the coherence of standing
doctrine, or deference doctrine, or even to today's prospects for meaningful climate
change legislation that is tailored to GHGs as a global environmental harm? 152 These are
the considerations that enter into judicial factoring on complex questions like default
rules for NEPA. And our non-centralized judiciary, overseen by a Supreme Court with
too little of itself to spread around, may just reproduce the diversity of interpretations
present in the public at large unless and until some more systemic factoring and/or
rulemaking is done. Given the state of statutory interpretation in our federal courts today,
that seems unlikely any time soon.
For all their contrasts, in other words, positive and normative statutory
interpretations will probably persist indefinitely in our environmental law because there
are plausible justifications for both of them across a vast array of interpretations of our
Constitution. Yet, as Joseph Raz has argued,
[Tlhe authoritative laying down of standards is the decisive moment in the legal process
not merely because in it new reasons [for action] are created. It is the decisive moment
because those new standards, those new reasons, are there to put an end to the argument
and struggle about what is to be done, to resolve the argument and the struggle by
replacing them for the time being. . .. The argument and struggle can and often do
continue. But now they are about whether and how to change the new law, and no longer
153
about whether to adopt it.

147. Karkkainen, supra n. 117, at 935.
148. 435 U.S. at 557-558; see Sam Kalen, The Devolution of NEPA: How the APA Transformed the
Nation'sEnvironmentalPolicy, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 483, 531-540 (2009).
149. See Jack M. Beerman & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856,
901 (2007) (arguing that another holding like Vermont Yankee is needed to counteract all the signals from the
Court that undermine what Vt. Yankee held).
150. See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534-535.
151. See Jonathan Martel, Climate Change Law and Litigation in the Aftermath of Massachusetts v. EPA, 7
Daily Env. Rprt. no. 214, 1 (Nov. 6, 2007).
152. Cf Kate Sheppard, Energy Industry Stall Tactic: Embrace EPA, http://washingtonindependent.com/
59889/energy-industry-stall-tactic-embrace-epa (Sept. 18, 2009) (arguing that industry sectors that had
previously opposed EPA regulation of GHGs under the CAA have pivoted to embrace EPA regulation under
the CAA as a way of forestalling the enactment of further legislation that regulates more quickly and
comprehensively).
153. Joseph Raz, Between Authority andInterpretation 109 (Oxford U. Press 2009).
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Thus, as our environmental priorities are set for us within the chaotic nexus of
judicial review of agency interpretations of legislation that is, in many if not most cases,
authored to avoid definitive resolution of exactly those priority questions, we have to
wonder what this practice is worth. In all probability, the more often such questions of
valuing nature's composition and function are brought to our appellate courts, the more
frequently they will tell us that they cannot author the nation's priorities-even as they
do so by default and without any systemic or methodologic coherence over time. Their
judgments add to the attractions and distractions of the circus, perhaps, but they do little
to improve its underlying structure.
IV.

CONCLUSION

At least since Mark Dowie published his unflinching indictment of the
environmental "movement" in America, it has been de rigueur to criticize
154
Even putting that
"environmentalists" for thinking tactically and not strategically.
meme aside, though, there is ample reason to conclude that the questions being litigated
today lack focus, even vitality. Categorical arguments against cost-benefit analysis,
strategic uses of NEPA as delay tactic: 'environmentalism' today more resembles a
circus than a movement.155 It boasts its own travelling companies of theatrical
performers: nonprofits that wage mythical struggles against Goliath-the multinational
enterprise that protests it has already spent too much for the environment to remain
'competitive.' And, acutely aware of the subtle ways in which trans-jurisdictional reform
has become the real driver of "environmental" progress today (and that they are poorly
suited to the superintending of that reform), our courts have called out the circus's
ringleaders.156 The problem is that there are no ringleaders. And the obvious alternative
audience for thinking and talking about our environmental norms and priorities-the
American public in all of its jurisdictional and institutional diversity-is too daunting a
157
prospect for all but the most strategically-minded.
Given the state of our political lives, reforming attitudes wholesale hardly seems
like a job for Congress, the President, or even for their administrative agencies.158 "At

154. See Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century
(MIT Press 1995); see also Andrew P. Morriss & Benjamin D. Cramer, DisestablishingEnvironmentalism, 39
Envtl. L. 309 (2009); Nordhaus & Shellenberger, supra n. 100.
155. The most disparaging comparison is usually to the civil rights movement, as if civil rights advocates
executed masterfully and with unexceptionable tactics and strategy. This is surely a caricature of both, though,
and we could go even further and argue that environmentalism as a singular "movement" has always been
misconceived. See e.g. Douglas Kysar, The Consultant'sRepublic, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 2041, 2047-2066 (2008).
Besides, there is reason to think that the civil rights movement was neither especially effective in strategy nor
in tactics as long as we include the pace of change occasioned by the civil rights movement in the assessment
of its efficacy. See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle
for Racial Equality (Oxford U. Press 2004).
156. See e.g. Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (accusing the EPA and
the Corps of shirking responsibilities by not having clarified the definitions of "waters of the United States"
following Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern Cook County v. Army CorpsofEngineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
157. See e.g. Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1135 (2009) (proposing a
communications strategy for radicalizing the American public on climate change that would include Biblical
parables, storytelling, "witnessing" and other techniques aimed at appealing to "values voters").
158. See James A. Gardner, What Are Political Campaigns For? The Role of Persuasion in Electoral Law
and Politics (Oxford U. Press 1959).
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the heart of republican electoral practice lay the belief that the people are incompetent to
evaluate either public policy or the job performance of hierarchically superior
government officials." 1 59 Moving Americans to change how they value nature's
composition and function or their longer-term resilience is, and will probably remain, an
inherently multi-scalar, multi-generational endeavor. Unfortunately, we do not conceive
of the CAA or the CWA in such terms and did not structure them accordingly. Especially
given the power of time as a variable, though, the bulk of our actions balancing risk,
equity, and efficiency under these statutes are provisional at best. 160 These goals are
simply too big and too demanding to think that even our expert agencies can pursue them
equally or evenly.
Still, while multi-factored decision-making is perhaps messy by nature, we have
reason to believe that it can be improved significantly by continuous and progressive
quantification-by a commitment to estimating relevant quantities.
We have no grounds for thinking our intuitions about very large numbers are reliable. On
the contrary, we have good grounds for mistrusting them. The evidence is that they are
often wrong because our imagination is not able to grasp just how big numbers can be. For
example, many people's intuition tells them that the process of natural selection, however
many billions of years it continued for, could not lead from primordial slime to creatures
with intelligence and consciousness. But they are wrong. Four billion years will do it.161
Categorical denunciations of "cost benefit analysis," in short, share something in
common with the increasingly pre-textual uses of NEPA's EIS requirement: they are
both beginning to cast the public as the object of "public" deliberation, as a mostly
perceptual agent prone more to cultural polarization than to collective action. And cynics
have reason to believe the public is just such an agent.162 But we have even better
reasons to control the cynical behaviors that encourage the public in that direction.
Indeed, as David Schoenbrod has argued, the confluence of cynical behaviors within the
current institutional structure of our environmental law is yielding a perfectly
163
uncooperative environment in which these inherently messy decisions must be made.
And there is blame enough to go around. A case like Winter v. NRDC reminds us how
often a group like NRDC can take its show (in this case, whales and SONAR) to the
Supreme Court and give that essentially conservative-arguably cynical-institution yet
another opportunity to make "bad" law, "bad" headlines, and big mistakes.
Environmental law in our appellate courts, in this regard, is becoming a curious
thing. It is neither a means nor an end in itself. A virtual mountain of work confronts our

159. Id. at 14 ("Instead, republicanism credited the people with a much narrower and more limited kind of
skill and judgment-the ability to judge character.").
160. On the potency of discount rates and discounting of future harms and benefits generally, see John
Broome, Discountingthe Future, 23 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 128 (1994).
161. John Broome, Weighing Lives 58 (Oxford U. Press 2004).
162. Indeed, we all have reason to so believe. See e.g. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively IlliberalState, 60
Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2007) (developing a "cultural cognition" theory of why and how different cultural groups
perceive risks differently and choose political adversaries and/or allies accordingly).
163. See generally David Schoenbrod, Saving Our Environment from Washington: How Congress Grabs
Power, Shirks Responsibility, and Shortchanges the People (Yale U. Press 2005). "Making it a secret that
practicality counts turns public discussions of environmental issues into stale cartoons that insult everyone's
intelligence." Id. at 195.
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legal system today and it consists most of all in the institutional choices we make on
matters like preemption, 164 the costs and benefits of information, 165 the pervasive
biasing in our legal system's agents,166 and the structure of legal entitlements. 167 Would
it help if any single interpreter were to offer up the "purposes" behind our environmental
statutes? What purpose is there in splitting the authority to permit "fill" discharges as
between the Corps of Engineers and the EPA?l 68 What purpose is there in the CWA's
use of "waters of the United States" as its jurisdictional geography?1 69 What purpose is
there in a text that directs the EPA to require the best technology "available" on an
industry-by-industry basis? 170 In truth, there probably are no ordered, intelligible
purposes behind these texts. They aggregate the overlapping, conflicting, and too often
equivocal purposes of their many different authors, some of whom are at generational
removes from each other. 17 1 The decisions that must be made in implementing them are
inherently under-determined, multi-dimensional, and representative in at least the
following sense: they reflect back to the public what the public itself has authored. But
this underscores what is perhaps the most pressing challenge of all in environmentalism
today: establishing a new form of agency that is inherently multi-lateral, multigenerational, and institutionally complex. It will demand fewer purely "federal," "state,"
or "local" institutions and more "diagonal" institutions that combine public officials from
all levels into new organizational forms. Collecting principals who respond to different
electorates and, therefore, to different priorities in a diagonal matrix of some kind could
empower them to aggregate their information and judgments in ways our current
institutions do not. That kind of agent probably has no recognizable principal, but it can
be self-governing with the right (motivationally-effective) deliberation.172 It can existbut it probably will not so long as courts and agencies dominate the ways in which we
collectively imagine ourselves and our environment.

164. Preemption choices are, encouragingly, attracting much more attention from institutionalists. See e.g.
William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/CeilingDistinction, 82 N.Y.U
L. Rev. 1521 (2007); Robert A. Schapiro , Polyphonic Federalism: Toward Protectionof FundamentalRights
(U. of Chicago Press 2009).
165. See e.g. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in
EnvironmentalRegulation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1409 (2008).
166. See e.g. Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
167. See e.g. Jamison E. Colbum, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights Experimentalism as Obligationto
Future Generations,77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1411 (2009).
168. Cf Coeur Alaska, 129 S.Ct. at 2467 ('The decision of the Court of Appeals [interpreting the term "fill
material"] in effect reallocated the division of responsibility that the Corps and the EPA had been
following .... We now hold that the decision of the Court of Appeals was incorrect.").
169. See Jamison E. Colbum, Waters of the United States: Theory, Practiceand Integrity at the Supreme
Court,34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 183 (2007).
170. See supra nn. 64-90 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. Rev. 204
(1980).
172. See Michael E. Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays 21-46 (Oxford U. Press 2007) (sketching a
theory of temporally-extended agency that relies on planning and self-governing policies).
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